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ISSUE

DOCUMENTING, REPRESENTING AND

THINKING ABOUT EXILE

ODYSSEY

ROADS

BORDERS

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SÉGOLÈNE **DÉBARRE**
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PATRICK **SIMON**

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PANTHÉON SORBONNE

Guest Editors

Alice Franck
is Maîtresse de conférences (Associate Professor) in Geography at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University, Researcher for the laboratory Prodig (UMR8586), Associate Researcher at CEDEJ-Khartoum (USR3123) and Fellow at the Convergence Migrations Institute.
Her research is mainly focused on Sudan, and concerns the city of Khartoum in particular, a city heavily marked by the issue of forced migration. She recently began research on the Sudanese and South-Sudanese communities in France. Since 2021, she has co-led the ANR-Thawra-Sur project "Thinking Alternative Worlds Across Sudanese Revolution."

Ségolène Débarre
is Maîtresse de conférences (Associate Professor) in Geography at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University, Researcher for the laboratory Géographie-Cités (UMR 8504), Associate Researcher at the Center for Turkish, Ottoman, Balkan and Central Asian Studies (UMR 8032) and the French Institut for Anatolian Studies (USR 3131). She is a Fellow at the Convergence Migrations Institute. Her research focuses on the European knowledge of the geography of the Turkish world and on migratory flows between Turkey and France. In 2019, she published *Histoire des Turcs en France* (A History of Turks in France) with Gay Petek at Détour publishers.

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Patrick Simon
is a socio-demographer,
Director of research at
the Ined (Unité Migrations
Internationales et Minorités),
Associate professor at IDUP,
Paris 1 Sorbonne-Panthéon
University, and Fellow at
the ICM. His work concerns
interethnic relations and
discrimination in multicultural
societies, the statistical
classifications of ethno-
racial diversity and the social
trajectories of immigrants
and their descendants.
He co-directs the study
"Trajectoires et Origines" on
diversity in France (2019-2020,
Ined-Insee) and coordinates
the project GLOBAL-RACE
funded by the ANR.

Translated by Nicholas Sowels

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AMANDA MURPHY
Amanda Murphy is from the United States but has lived in France since 2007. She holds a PhD in Comparative Literature from the Sorbonne Nouvelle and is currently Maîtresse de conférences (Associate Professor) at the Sorbonne Nouvelle in English and Translation Studies. She is the author of *Ecrire, lire, traduire entre les langues: défis et pratiques de la poétique multilingue* (Classiques Garnier, 2023).

NICHOLAS SOWELS
Nicholas Sowels is a Senior Lecturer in English for economics at the Département des langues, where he has taught since the late 1990s. His present research areas include economic and public policy in the United Kingdom, Brexit and finance, as well as poverty and inequality in the UK. He also works as a freelance translator and editor of texts written in English by non-native speakers.

Documenting, Representing and Thinking about Exiles

Translated by
Nicholas Sowels

> **Exile is a sentence that condemns an individual to leave their country, either permanently or temporarily, and historically it was a form of banishment, a *"punishment through space"*. It raises questions about the relationship to power and the way the latter sets out its territorial limits and political values.**

or Sayad, "*exile does not always take the same form. Sometimes it is long, and sometimes it is not so long; sometimes, it is permanent, and sometimes it is temporary. In some cases there is no choice (as when a person is banished, deported or forced to flee); in others, exile is intentional – at least apparently so. Sometimes the outcome depends solely on the person concerned; sometimes it hinges on the goodwill of a third party.*"[1] Exile is a notion with many contours and strongly permeates our Western imaginations. From Homer, Eschyle and Ovid, to Victor Hugo, Mahmoud Darwich and Marie Ndiaye, many writings have shed light on exile by embodying life trajectories and sublimating the feelings of loss and nostalgia for lands of origin – sometimes at the risk of idealisation. These texts make up what Alexis Nous calls a "*migratory literature*", a term that highlights the troubled and porous borders between exile and migration: all exile is migration, but all migration is not exile.[2]

Exile is a sentence that condemns an individual to leave their country, either permanently or temporarily, and historically it was a form of banishment, a "*punishment through space*".[3] It raises questions about the relationship to power and the way the latter sets out its territorial limits and political values. As such, exile is the counterpart of *asylum,* which is based (or should be based) on policies and mechanisms of inclusion, hospitality and reception – whereas *exile* is exclusion. Exile in its historical form is today explicitly prohibited by several international conventions, such as the 1963 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in which Protocol 4 prohibits the expulsion of nationals. However, in the fight against terrorism, policies of stripping nationality have brought this form of punishment back to the fore.[4] At the collective level, exile as banishment may lead to new political arrangements, notably "governments in exile" which claim the legitimacy of a power they have been deprived of. Resulting from coups or foreign military occupations, these political arrangements may be sustained and perpetuated, the most emblematic case presently being that of the Central Tibetan Administration, installed in Dharamsala (India) since 1959.

Apart from punishment, exile more generally in common parlance evokes the experience of migration forced by danger. The Western imagination of this meaning is shaped by the cultural and religious heritage of the three monotheistic religions, in which "flight" permeates their founding texts: the Exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt in the Old Testament, the flight to Egypt of Mary and Joseph in the New Testament, and the Hegira of Muhammad leaving Mecca for Medina in the Koran. In this more extensive meaning, exile includes the idea of forced departure, of distance from home residence and relatives, involving suffering linked to uprooting and a changed environment. The place of exile can then become a place of absence – "*a non-place, a*

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1 Abdelmalek Sayad, "A Land of No Return", *The UNESCO Courier*, 49th year, October 1996.

2 Alexis Nous, "Littérature, exil et migration", *Hommes & Migrations*, 2018/1 (No 1320), p. 161a–164a. 4091.

3 Frédéric Constant, "Punir par l'espace : la peine d'exil dans la Chine impériale", *Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident* [on-line], 40, 2016.

4 Jules Lepoutre, "Le bannissement des nationaux. Comparaison (France-Royaume-Uni) au regard de la lutte contre le terrorisme", *Revue critique de droit international privé*, Vol. 1, No.1, 2016, pp. 107–118.

nowhere" as Georges Perec wrote about *Ellis Island*.[5] Yet, while the experience of exile is often traumatic, it may also involve initiation, and a way to renewal, or may even be a source of creation.[6] In the European tradition, the link between exile, creativity and artistic sublimation is reinforced by the fact that exile has often been associated with the forced departure of elites (intellectuals, artists and political opponents), more than of common citizens. In these representations, the exiled person benefits from a kind of aura, sometimes tinged with romanticism, and enjoys a certain nobility.

Today, the notion of exile is once again summoned in the aftermath of migrations following the deadly convulsions in Syria, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa and, more recently, in Ukraine. The term "exile" as action and as a person has replaced the terms "immigration" and "migrant", which are worn out by undifferentiated use, and most often depreciated, sometimes even stigmatised. The use of "exile" as a noun makes it possible to deconstruct the idea of anonymous human flows in order to emphasise and situate both individual and plural trajectories. Depending on the situation, it allows overcoming institutional and legal categorisations that do not reflect the complexity of migratory situations. The word "exile" also creates distance with the caricatures of migrants from the South who abuse the hospitality of countries in the North. After having been used by NGOs and in militant circles, this term has entered academia, reflecting the engagement of scientific research and institutions. This is particularly the case in France with the "National Programme of Emergency Reception of Scientists and Artists in Exile" (*Programme national d'Accueil en Urgence des Scientifiques et des artistes en Exil* or PAUSE).[7] And Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University now also offers a diploma in learning French, to help exiled students transition into French universities (*Passerelles students en Exil* or PEPS).[8]

Echoing these initiatives, this dossier looks at how researchers from different disciplines (demography, law, economics, history, art history and geography) use – or do not use – the notion of exile in their work, as well as the methodological and theoretical issues that these uses raise. If "migration needs numbers, exile demands words; migration consists of a journey, exile is the narrative of the journey".[9] Exile as such has no legal basis, nor is it a statistical category. Accordingly, this dossier examines exile in its different manifestations and meanings, without minimising the limits that these may entail. The articles here address the subjective, memorial and statutory dimensions of exile, as well as the trajectories and institutional processing of exiled persons. They shed light on the way we think about exile, and how it is represented and documented in the research work of different disciplines at the Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University and its affiliated research centres. ⬢

SÉGOLÈNE DÉBARRE, ALICE FRANCK & PATRICK SIMON

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The use of "exile" as a noun makes it possible to deconstruct the idea of anonymous human flows in order to emphasise and situate both individual and plural trajectories.
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5 Robert Bober and Georges Perec, *Récits d'Ellis Island. Histoires d'errance et d'espoir*, Paris, Gallimard, Collection 'Fiction', …éditions P.O.L, 1994.

6 Isabelle Lacoue-Labarthe and Elias Sanbar, "De l'exil forcé à l'exil choisi… Entretien avec Elias Sanbar", *Diasporas*, 22, 2013, p. 21-37.

7 https://www.college-de-france.fr/site/programme-pause/index.htm

8 https://langues.pantheonsorbonne.fr/evenements/diplome-universitaire-passerelle-etudiants-en-exil-pantheon-sorbonne-peps

9 Alexis Nuselovici, https://theconversation.com/bonnes-feuilles-droit-dexil-pour-une-politisation-de-la-question-migratoire-166707

Discussing and Categorizing the Exiled in the Law

The law, be it international, European, or French, does not recognize the notion of exile. However, it deals with it everyday and governs the condition and the existence of exiled people. But it does so under its own terms.

Ségolène Barbou des Places

Professor of Law,
European Union Specialist
in the Rights of Persons,
and Member
of the Sorbonne Institut
of Research in
International and
European Law (IREDIES).

Translated by
Amanda Murphy

Exile, a category missing from the law

"Exile" is not a legal category, if we understand a category to be collection of things, facts or acts sharing common characteristics and respecting a common legal regime. Although the law has not ignored the notion of exile. On the contrary, Roman jurisconsults described it as the sentence that forces someone to leave his or her country, without the possibility of returning. But the sentence of exile is illegal under contemporary international and European law. As stated in article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (December 16, 1966) and in article 3 of Protocol 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights that no person can be expulsed from the territory of a State of which that person is a national, nor can that person be forbidden the right to enter the territory of that State. The notion of exile has therefore disappeared from the realm of penal law.

As for the notion of exile used in common language or in social sciences, which serves to describe the state of a person who has left his or her country or usual place of residence under obligation, it is not part of the instruments used in the law on foreigners and asylum. The law on foreigners and asylum has its own categories, which do not include exile: categories of people ("asylum-seekers", "refugees", "unaccompanied minors" for example), often defined by their administrative or legal situation (a person in an irregular situation, a person waiting for a residence permit or visa, a person who has been subjected to an expulsion measure, etc.). The law also has its categories for places (the waiting zone, the detention center, the shelter for asylum-seekers), its categories for actions (obligation to leave French territory, measures for detention, for example), and its own institutions (the prefect, the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Frontex). But the individual and social reality of exile, the disorientation that results from it, the sense of uprooting, the specific vulnerabilities that stem from forced departure, are not discussed, and are mentioned only marginally, in the law. Exile does not have its own judicial regime. The law does not "speak" exile.

Exile and the exiled in the words of the law

However, the law constantly deals with "the exiled" and governs the modalities of their situation. But it does so with its own expressions and in its own ways. As such, the law on foreigners provides the exiled with, and imposes upon them, the words with which to explain the reasons for their exile. Their fears must therefore be formulated to express the "legitimate fear" of persecution; the abuse experienced or the injustice suffered have to be described in terms of "discrimination" or as a risk "of serious violation of fundamental rights", linked for example to an "armed conflict" or a situation of "indiscriminate violence". Sometimes people who are not even aware they belong to the same group, and may not want to belong to it, have to declare they a member of a "social group" in order to increase their chances of obtaining refugee status. Even the way they tell the story of their exile before the National Court of Asylum is shaped by the judicial framework, though according to the Code on the entry and residence of foreigners and asylum-seekers (hereafter CESEDA), the story can take on any form since it is merely a matter of "presenting, as quickly as possible, all the elements necessary to support the request for asylum". However, CESEDA article L.723-4 lists the elements considered to be pertinent for telling the story: age, personal history, including family history, identity, nationality or nationalities, the country as well as the places where the person has previously resided, previous requests for asylum, his or her itinerary, as well as the reasons for the request. This list suggests a certain kind of story-telling, in the terms that will allow for the conviction to emerge, in the mind of the authority or the asylum judge, that the person truly fits into one of the categories provided for by the law. Putting the

Code on the entry and residence of foreigners and on the right of asylum

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exiled person's past into words is a highly codified process. The same goes for the aspirations of exiled people, which are translated into legal language. "Living happily", "living safely", or "living without fear", "starting over" or "simply reclaiming one's life" are not expressions that exist in the CESEDA, nor in the Geneva Convention of 1951 on refugees, nor in the European directives on asylum. What the exiled can aspire to – under certain conditions – is to be "protected", then to be "integrated", which often means to be naturalized. Protection and integration are two poles on which the legal affairs of the exiled hinge. Even the amount of time for "legal exile" is determined by the law, as both the Geneva Convention and the European norms on asylum and French law dictate when protection will cease. The most flagrant case is that of temporary protection, which the Council of the European Union (EU) has recently activated to benefit people fleeing Ukraine: it will end, for everyone and without any possibility of prolongation, on February 24, 2025 at the latest. The Ukrainians who hope to remain in the EU after this date, to continue to work, or for family reasons, will have to show their situation fits into another category of exile. They will have to apply for refugee status or to benefit from subsidiary protection, a protective regime created for people who cannot be granted refugee status, but for whom there are serious reasons to believe that they run the risk of suffering serious violations if they are sent back to the State of origin, unless they "exit" the asylum regime and manage to apply for worker status, are a family member of an EU citizen, or fit into any other category that the administrative authorities do not associate with the idea of forced expulsion. The language of the law therefore englobes the past, the present and the future of the exiled.

> **The main distinction between economic "migrants" and "refugees" governs international, European and French migration law.**

Classifying and hierarchizing the exiled

This same legal language is a powerful instrument in the selection and hierarchization of the different kinds of exile. This is not a new idea: the main distinction between economic "migrants" and "refugees" governs international, European and French migration law. Studies are not nonetheless lacking, which demonstrates the extent to which this distinction is a construction[1] that inadequately describe reality, and in fact twists it: it is possible to be both an economic migrant and a refugee at the same time. But the category of "refugee" is the only one that describes legitimate exile: the refugee deserves protection while the economic migrant does not. As for the beneficiary of subsidiary protection, he or she deserves protection, but a little less than the refugee. Furthermore, certain forms of exile are not considered as such. This will surely be the case of the inhabitants of the Kiribati islands when they are forced to leave their devoured island. There is no legal category to date allowing for the proper consideration of the reasons for their forced movement or their need for protection. One is only exiled, legally speaking, if a norm

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1 Karen AKOKA, *L'asile et l'exil. Une histoire de la distinction réfugiés/migrants*, Paris, La Découverte, 2020.

says it is so. For this reason, people coming from Ukraine may benefit from the temporary protection conferred by the European Union while Syrians, who in 2015 were also fleeing war and indiscriminate threats, were not considered as such: the Council of the EU did not in fact manage to obtain the qualified majority needed to activate the directive on temporary protection. What's more, Ukrainians who fled Ukraine before February 24th, and students from other States who were temporarily residing in Ukraine at the start of the war, and who could not return to their home countries, are excluded from the status granting temporary protection. All exiled people are not *legally* exiled, or at least not under the same terms.

Though exile is not an official legal category, international, European and national norms determine the lives of the exiled on a daily basis. The law on foreigners and asylum structures and permeates the existence of exiled peoples. It governs the entirety of what we often call their "migratory path": access to the national territory, residence, access to work and other social rights, the possibility of family life, potential political rights. It is therefore the exiled person's entire professional, social, family, affective and emotional life that falls under the law on foreigners. The law singles out expected, desirable and valued ways of life: obeying, waiting for authorization, remaining static, integrating, proving that a marriage is based on sincere feelings, etc.

Observers of the practices of French and European authorities are increasingly attentive to the "rightless zones" that facilitate the infringement of the rights of the exiled. The Franco-Italian border is a topical example of this reality. But in many cases, it is not the insufficiency of the law that impacts the lives of the exiled, but an "excess of laws". ⬡

One is only exiled, legally speaking, if a norm says it is so.

Belonging from Afar: Sudanese refugees in France supporting Revolution[1]

On 23 December 2018, the first rally in support of the revolution that was then emerging in Sudan took place at the Place de la République in Paris. A group of about 200 people assembled Sudanese of different generations and political stripes, who were settled in France for more or less long periods of time.

Marie Bassi
Associate Professor of Political Science (ERMES) at Côte d'Azur University.

Pauline Brücker
Migrinter Postdoctoral Fellow, Associate Researcher at CERI and Fellow at the ICM.

Alice Franck
Associate Professor of Geography and Member of the Research Pole for the Organizaion and Diffusion of Geographical Information (PRODIG).

Translated by
Nicholas Sowels

he Paris protesters took up slogans chanted on Sudanese streets: "*tesgot bas!* ("The fall, that's all!), *"horeya, salam w 'adala, el-thowra khyar el-sha'b!"* ("Freedom, peace and justice, revolution is the people's choice!"). This gathering marked the beginning of a long series of events organised in many French cities. Each time, the demand was the same: the fall of the regime. This mobilisation in exile, in support of the nascent revolution, seemed to engage Sudanese refugees in a remote political struggle that brought them together. During the first months of this revolution, these protests laid the foundations for a new social group and an identity as the "Sudanese of France".[2] They were in exile, and the group emerged in French public spaces, contrasting with the impression of a national group that had hitherto been fragmented. Drawing on an initial identification of two migratory generations – *the elders* and *the young* – we have observed what this revolution has done to their respective and collective commitments.[3]

Two generations of Sudanese migrants to France

According to France's Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides, OFPRA) there were nearly 16,000 statutory Sudanese refugees in France in 2019 [see graph 1].[4] This Sudanese community can be broadly divided into two groups: the *elders* who fled the repression and political purges in the early years of the military-Islamist regime of Omar Al-Bashir; and the *young*, who left almost 20 years later, following armed conflicts fuelled by the regime, especially in Darfur, and whose arrivals provoked a tremendous increase in Sudanese asylum applications in France.

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1 This text reproduces a more extensive article on "Supporting a revolution from afar: the construction of unity between generations of Sudanese exiles in France", published in *Mediterranean Politics*, 2022.

2 This was an expression used by a Sudanese exile.

3 See for example the distinction by Abdelmalek Sayad, "Les trois 'âges' de l'émigration algérienne en France", *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 15, 1977, p. 59–79.

4 Other Sudanese need to be added to this figure : persons awaiting asylum procedures; those denied the right of asylum; holders of student or work visas; and refugees naturalized over the years.

While most of the *elders* arrived after Omar Al-Bashir's coup in 1989 and its wake, a small number of Sudanese – around 200 – were already residing in France. Most were students and had chosen not to return to Sudan after the coup. They were joined during the 1990s by a new generation of students opposed to the new regime, including journalists, members of political parties, and intellectuals. Nearly all these persons belong to the elite of Northern Sudan and the Nile Valley and have significant cultural, academic, economic, and political capital. At the time, they all arrived by plane, after having obtained a student or tourist visa, and without having suffered today's illegal journeys by road and by sea.

The Sudanese community in France was shaken in the mid-2010s by the important and unprecedented arrivals of *young* people, mostly from Darfur who were fleeing from Sudan, via Libya or Egypt, seeking to reach Europe by the Mediterranean route. Between 2013 and 2014, their number increased by 139%, with the Sudanese then being the largest national group to apply for asylum in France in 2015, and the third largest group to obtain refugee status. These arrivals gave unprecedented visibility to the Sudanese community, which has been permanently reframed. This new generation of exiled *young* has different socio-political characteristics to their *elders*. Born in 1990, mostly in Darfur, these young people do not belong to the privileged classes of Sudan and do not have the same economic or cultural capital than the *elders*. Many, however, have educational capital, having benefited from the policies democratising higher education and which often led them to begin university studies where they were subsequently politicised before their departure into exile.

Another difference with the *elders* is that these *young* refugees have known only the Islamo-military power of Omar Al-Bashir, whose violence they have suffered from directly, be it in the wars in Darfur in particular which they have fled, or from racial discrimination. The relationship these *young* have with Sudanese politics is thus dominated by an experience of violence, and structured by their proximity to armed movements fighting against Sudan's central government.

Unlike their *elders*, their exile is marked by confrontation with repressive immigration and asylum policies. Having entered Europe illegally, they are hampered in their mobility across the continent, threatened by the Dublin Convention and the permanent risk of having to return to Italy. They were often also stuck in the Calais "Jungle", or in the informal settlements that have sprung up in the north of Paris, due to lack of hospitality policy and insufficient accommodation for hosting migrants. Despite the experience of these situations of great precariousness, these camps have become places of intense socialisation and politicisation. Indeed, these difficulties have first reinforced the mutual knowledge of each other by Sudanese migrants, many of whom lived together in the area between the Halle Pajol and the former Lycée Jean-Quarré, occupied between June and October 2015, in Paris's 18th and 19th districts. These camps and collective actions in favour of these migrants' rights to a dignified welcome in France have fostered strong relations with French persons involved in various organisations that

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Demonstration in support of the Sudanese revolution, June 30, 2019.

University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne / #1257

> **By experiencing the revolution together "from afar", a long way from their loved ones and far from the heart of activist spaces, the two generations of exiled Sudanese shared their "absence" from their home country, during this period of intense political change, and which sometimes generated strong feelings of guilt.**

support refugees. Migrants' social capital is thus supplemented by the construction of militant capital in France through their participation in various political actions, following contact with "support" groups. The *young* migrants are thus socialised in ways and places of commitment specific to the French political culture. They have gradually reinvested this knowledge and this know-how in the organisation of mobilisations related to current affairs in Sudan.

Meetings and rallies have been organised that strengthened links established with French "supporters", but also a rapprochement with the generation of *elders*. The war in Darfur has been one of the main reasons for denouncing the regime during these protest actions. But, it has become a unifying cause beyond specific and regional identities, as testified, for example, by the words an *elder* of the political opposition to the regime of Omar Al-Bashir: "But during the last three years, you know, there were demonstrations all the time. There were demonstrations for Darfur, against the use of chemical weapons in Darfur. We did things to welcome the Sudanese. We did a lot in the period from 2013 to 2018".[5] The bringing-together of the two generations in Paris and Lyon from 2014 onwards, under the name of "*Sudanese activists*" bore this out, as it deliberately allowed the creation of collectives freed from partisan commitment and regional belonging. This has been reflected *in* and laid the first foundation stones *of* networks and common activities that were reinvested at the time of the revolution.

However, these common commitments have not masked the profound differences that structure their representations and aspirations, as well as the mutual distrust between these two groups, which has characterised the generational divide. As with the *young*, the *elders* have shifted far from their daily concerns, and their political aspirations, and are disconnected from the Sudanese socio-political context. According to the *elders*, these *young* migrants were inexperienced, and poorly educated in traditional politics. Consequently, they considered them not very likely to have a lasting impact in France or Sudan.

The momentum of the two generations serving the revolution

The emergence of the popular uprising in Sudan from December 2018 onwards has restructured the social and political organisation of the Sudanese in France who asserted themselves, at least for a time, as the "Sudanese of France", by highlighting their "Sudanese" identity and drawing on a common desire for regime change. This led to inclusive discourses among the refugees (the *elders* and the *young)* who became "ambassadors" of the "Sudanese of France",[6] and indeed "entrepreneurs of the diasporic cause".[7] Throughout the months that followed, the

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5 Interview with R. Khartoum, February 2020. He returned to Sudan after years of exile in France and joined the transitional government (Ministry of Communication) at the end of 2019.

6 Extracts from an interview with a young refugee from Darfur in the summer of 2019 and a public presentation about the revolution in January 2022 by another young Darfouri.

7 Fiona Adamson, "Constructing the diaspora. Diaspora identity politics and transnational social movements", in Terrence LYONS and Peter MADAVILLE (Éd.), *Politics from afar. Transnational diaspora and networks*, 2012, p. 25–42.

Sudanese refugees sought to publicise and stir debate about the nascent revolution to give visibility to the Sudanese popular uprising and to call on international opinion, particularly in France. There was a proliferation and diversification of events that brought together large sections of Sudanese residents in France, transcending the generational divide.

By experiencing the revolution together "from afar", a long way from their loved ones and far from the heart of activist spaces, the two generations of exiled Sudanese shared their "absence"[8] from their home country, during this period of intense political change, and which sometimes generated strong feelings of guilt. They met at various events. They participated in and organised together the links and communications between the Sudanese revolutionaries in Sudan and the diaspora in France, according to the phases of the uprising, promoting the creation of intergenerational connections and knowledge and establishing a community of practices.

Diasporic disillusionment

As doubts and disappointment about the outcome of the revolution emerged, the discourse and actions of the Sudanese diaspora became increasingly structured around the geographical origins and ethnic affiliations of the migrants. If the popular uprising reconciled the Sudanese in France (and Sudan) for a time, by allowing ethnic and regional divisions to be overcome,it did not erase the long-lasting effect of an established system of domination in which the refugees did *not* occupy the same place. The second-generation of refugees, who are in the majority in France, are mostly from marginalised territories, particularly Darfur. Despite the inclusive slogans of the revolution, the issue of Darfur actually remains a central topic for the future of Sudan and also characterises the refugee community.

"Today, there are differences, splits in the Sudanese community. They [the Darfouri] want the question of Darfur to be central or to be addressed. They think this is Sudan's only problem. You have just arrived! We were refugees before you and you just arrived. The government's problem is with all Sudanese, not just with Darfur".[9]

This dynamic is linked to the statuses and hierarchies of Sudanese society. But it is also linked to the conditions of exile and migration policies which have reinforced the differentiations *young* Sudanese refugees and others. The *young* are now at the head of many collectives and associations whose activities are linked to the situation in Sudan or other "causes". This phenomenon reveals the place won by the younger generation, especially those from marginalised regions, in a form of social revenge allowed by the revolution in exile. ◆

> **If the popular uprising reconciled the Sudanese in France (and Sudan) for a time, by allowing ethnic and regional divisions to be overcome, it did not erase the long-lasting effect of an established system of domination in which the refugees did not occupy the same place.**

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8 Abdelmalek Sayad, *La double absence. Des illusions de l'émigré aux souffrances de l'immigré*, Paris, Seuil, 1999.

9 Interview with an *elder* in Lyon in 2021.

From the Russian Empire to Current-day Russia: (Hi)stories and Memories of Exile

The war started by Russia on February 24, 2022 has forced millions of individuals onto the roads of exile. In Ukraine, the massive displacement of people does not however date back to the beginning of 2022; it goes back to 2014, when Crimea was annexed, and to the beginning of the conflict in the Donbass. 1.7 million internal refugees are estimated, to which another million, who have fled to Russia, must be added.[1]

François-Xavier Nérard

Associate Professor of Contemporary History and Member of the UMR Sorbonne-Identities, International Relations and Civilizations of Europe (SIRICE).

Translated by
Amanda Murphy

he Russian military offensive has multiplied the number of exiles, even if it's quite difficult to know exactly how many people have been forced to leave their homes and their country. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR), 5 million Ukrainians have fled the country since April 22.[2] If we take into account the 7 million displaced people inside the borders, that makes up nearly a quarter of the population of the country. Some are even doubly concerned, forced to abandon yet again their new residence after having left Crimea or the Donbass in 2014. In addition to the Ukrainians attempting to escape the violence of war, there are also those in political disagreement with Vladimir Putin's government and who have decided to leave Russia, though they are less directly threatened, the number of which is even more difficult to estimate, since these individuals are not taken care of by any organization: the Russian demographer Ioulia Florinskaya evokes nonetheless the quite credible number of 150,000 people who may have reached Turkey, Georgia or Amenia, mainly.[3]

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1 Rémi NOYON, « Entretien avec la chercheuse Ioulia Shukan », L'Obs, février 2022 [en ligne : https://www.nouvelobs.com/idees/20220225.OBS54994/quelle-forme-prend-la-resistance-ukrainienne-entretien-avec-la-chercheuse-ioulia-shukan.html].
The French version of this paper was written in June 2022. The number of Russian exiles has since exploded, mainly after the mobilization declared by President Vladimir Putin on September 21st 2022

2 « Guerre en Ukraine : la barre des 5 millions de réfugiés franchie, selon l'ONU », ONU Info [en ligne : https://news.un.org/fr/story/2022/04/1118592].

3 https://meduza.io/feature/2022/05/07/skolko-lyudey-uehalo-iz-rossii-iz-za-voyny-oni-uzhe-nikogda-ne-vernutsya-mozhno-li-eto-schitat-ocherednoy-volnoy-emigratsii

In a strange stroke of history repeating itself, almost 100 years ago, between 1920 and 1922, millions of people were already forced to leave Russia or the former imperial Russian territory. The civil war that would follow the October Revolution of 1917 would indeed provoke, or at least was accompanied by, a great exodus. And it is yet again difficult to provide a precise number: those who left the country in November 1920 are estimated at two million.

Massive exile was not entirely unknown in the lands ruled until February 1917, by the Russian Emperor. They were, indeed, in the 1980s the stage of a first great wave of emigration. This wave concerned the Jewish population who fled the pogroms that were becoming increasingly present and increasingly violent. They gained significant importance following the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, then even more so throughout the reign of Nicolas II, in particular between 1903 and 1907. Nearly 2 million Jews left the Russian Empire between 1891 and 1912. More than 80% of them crossed the Atlantic to the United States. They were not the only ones to leave; Poles and Turkish-speaking Muslims also fled to escape Russian oppression.

But it was the civil war that would provoke, at the beginning of the 1920s, a new significant wave of exile. The takeover by the Bolsheviks was rapidly contested by several adversaries: white monarchists, aided by foreign armies, nationalists, including Ukrainians; peasants; and anarchists. The country was turned into a great battlefield that no one controlled very well. Cities, in particular the capital Petrograd, were soon hit with famine. Due to political and military violence, insecurity reigned over the civil population who sought protection. In the end, it was the defeat of the white armies in 1920 that would lead to the first massive departures.

Three options were available to those who wanted to leave the country, even temporarily. To the west, the newly drawn borders between Poland and the Soviet Union (The Peace of Riga was signed in March 1921), as well as the Finnish border and the new Baltic republics, allowed for many departures. Russian prisoners of war also made the choice not to return to Soviet territory. To the east, Blagovechtchensk served as an exit point on the way to Manchuria, and the city of Harbin, which had been crucial in the history of the construction of the East China railroad, a trans-Siberian branch, became a major center of Russian emigration.

Finally, the southern area of the former Empire, and its numerous ports on the Black Sea: Odessa, Novorossiysk, in Crimea or in Georgia played an essential role. In any case, these are the best documented departures places of departure with numerous stories and photographs remaining. The writer Mikhail Boulgakov, in his play *La fuite* [the escape], describes with gripping detail the general free-for-all of

Sebastropol, Russia, June 16, 2021: Monument to the victims of the civil war.

those who refused the new government in power, or feared it, and of those who fled war and violence. The reasons for heading south were quite variable, as Catherine Gousseff demonstrates.[4] Some were forced by the military advances, some by the presence of one political force or the other, and others sought to escape degraded living conditions, hunger, or epidemics. These meridional lands and former holiday destinations, that were once a space where one could hope to find shelter while waiting for better days, became, in October-November 1920, places leading to no other possibility but leaving by sea. This extremely heterogeneous congregation of civilians, military and representatives of the elite, as well as people from more modest backgrounds, would face the advances of the Red Army in November 1920. On the 8th, the Red Army entered Crimea through the Perekop Isthmus. On the 14th, all the cities, in particular Simferopol and Sebastopol, were controlled by the troops commanded by Frunze. The last of the fighters, on the orders of Baron Wrangel, alongside many civilians, had to embark on 126 boats leaving the ports of Sebastopol, Yevpatoria, Kertch, Feodossia and Yalta. They were a little over 135,000, about half military and half civilian, to leave their homeland for a period that they hoped would be temporary.

> **At the end of the civil war in 1922, exile also became a political weapon. The Bolsheviks decided to introduce in the penal Code the possibility of expulsion as an alternative to the death penalty.**

At the end of the civil war in 1922, exile also became a political weapon. The Bolsheviks decided to introduce in the penal Code the possibility of expulsion as an alternative to the death penalty. In 1922, more than a hundred of the most brilliant intellectuals in the country were banished from Soviet Russia.[5] While the borders of the RSFSR and then of the USSR remained somewhat open until the end of the 1920s, no departures were possible following the increase in regulations and checkpoints in 1931. This marked the end of the emigration that we call "Russian" for lack of a better word, even though those who left belonged to several different nationalities of the former Romanov Empire. But the USSR did not cease nonetheless to be a land of exile. The Second World War signaled many departures, in particular of displaced people who gave up on going back after the war, or opponents, sometimes having collaborated with the Nazi enemy and fearing Soviet purge. Later, after 1967, the country saw a significant wave of Jewish emigration: 175,000 people left the country (mainly for Israel or the United States) between 1970 and 1978. Lastly, great migratory movements accompanied the fall of the country in 1991: more than a million Russians went abroad, in particular to the United States, but there were also Russian minorities from the former Soviet Republics who returned to Russia.

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4 Catherine GOUSSEFF, L'exil russe : La fabrique du réfugié apatride (1920-1939), CNRS … éditions, 2008, p. 27-45.

5 Michel HELLER, « Premier avertissement : un coup de fouet [L'histoire de l'expulsion des personnalités culturelles hors de l'Union soviétique en 1922] », Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique, 20(2), 2, 1979, p. 131-172.

After 2014, the Russian government thoroughly developed its discourse intended for Russian's abroad. The idea of a "Russian world" bringing together the diaspora, the exiled of the past and of today, around the mother country has been heavily promoted and is the object of multiple initiatives and sources of funding. A monument in Sebastopol in Crimea, erected by the Russian authorities, inaugurated in April 2021 and visited by President Vladimir Putin in November of the same year, calls for particular attention. In commemoration of the "end of the civil war in Southern Russia", the work of sculptor Andrey Kovaltchouk depicts two soldiers, one White and one Red, dominated by Mother-Russia.

The monument therefore offers a double discourse. It is, above all, a monument to the Russian claim over the peninsula, as well as a monument to a people united despite the civil war.

Even the title of the monument erases any presence of Ukraine in the city. The title is, indeed, smart. Crimea was indeed "Southern Russia" in 1920, and in fact, Ukrainian Rada, the assembly that proclaimed the independence of the country in 1918 did not even claim it as Ukrainian. Nonetheless, "Southern Russia" did not take on the same meaning in 2021 as in 1920. It creates an eminently political continuity in a land that was Ukrainian until 2014, and establishes continuity between the pre-civil war period and the current day. We also find, under the two soldiers, two "explanatory" bas-reliefs: one represents the Bolsheviks calling up the workers in a factory, and the other, white soldiers headed toward a boat to evacuate. Neither are depicted in the thrill victory or in the sadness of defeat; they are merely marked by the magnitude of History. The heartbreak and exile are associated with a moment that, although painful, is definitively over. Yet, the discourse on the past has become a discourse on the present. President Putin could thus, in November 2021, affirm that Russia "loved all its sons […], no matter which side of the barricade they found themselves on…". He could still, just a few months ago, give the impression of wanting to put an end to the hellish cycle of war and violence, that fueled the exile. However, it was the Russian Army that, by invading Ukraine on February 24,2022 reopened that very cycle. ⬡

> " The idea of a "Russian world" bringing together the diaspora, the exiled of the past and of today, around the mother country has been heavily promoted and is the object of multiple initiatives and sources of funding. "

The Exile and Survival of Polish Jews, 1920–1950: A Transnational Collective Biography

Lubartworld is a transnational history project that aims to write the collective biography of the Jewish inhabitants of Lubartów in Poland, from 1920 to 1950, whether they emigrated or remained there, survived the Holocaust or were exterminated.

Claire Zalc
Research Director at the CNRS, Study Director at the EHESS and Head of the GLOBAL Department of the Migrations Convergence Institute

Translated by
Nicholas Sowels

ocated 80 kilometres from the Ukrainian border, the small town of Lubartów, in Poland, has developed initiatives to organize and welcome Ukrainian refugees who have been arriving there in numbers. Since March 2022, the region around Lublin has been transformed into a gigantic reception centre. Hundreds of thousands of people have been in transit there, with hotels being requisitioned. We had planned to go there, with the *Lubartworld* project team at the end of May 2022. The aim was to take advantage of the lifting of travel restrictions related to the Covid-19 pandemic, which had already caused our visits to Poland be cancelled three times. We were looking to organize an investigation workshop in the archives, meet the inhabitants, and visit sites. The outbreak of the war in nearby Ukraine once again compromised this plan.

The starting point
I had not chosen this city as a starting point for its picturesque or remarkable character. Nor was representativeness a factor. Lubartów was not, strictly speaking, a *shtetl*, but an ordinary city, with a population of mixed confessions. In 1932, the town included about 3,400 Jews and 4,000 Catholics. Its medium size has been quite important, because the town is small enough to make it possible to search for information about each of its inhabitants and their lives, and at the same time it is large enough to offer a diverse social land-scape. The profusion of local sources was also a determining factor. The choice was both arbitrary and intimate, and made notably as a nod to Georges Perec, since Lubartów was his father's birthplace.
So the approach of this project could be described as "Perecquian". It involves reconstructing, one-by-one, entire individual trajecto-ries of all the Jewish inhabitants of this small Polish town, from the beginning of 1920s through to the 1950s, whether they emigrated or remained, whether they were exterminated or survived the Shoah.
In doing so, the aim is to understand the dynamics of a social struc-ture subject major upheaval, by studying the social conditions and

Lichtmans

The Lichtman family

The Lubartworld project

the consequences of the destruction of a community. Who fled? When? Where did they go? With whom? Who survived and who did not survive? This is not merely a question of counting how many individuals left or stayed; or how many were deported or not. But it means understanding the links between trajectories of persecution and trajectories of migration, in the light of family, economic and neighbourhood environments. The comparison of the migration and persecution processes is based on an intensive study, not of a place, but of the people of that place. This is one of the challenges and one of the difficulties of conducting an overall micro-history of the Shoah, viewed here in its interconnections with migrations, in their global dimensions, in the world of the first half of the 20th century.

While the project begins in Lubartów, it does indeed lead to the world as a whole, because Lubartówians crossed continents and their trajectories embody, in their own way, the upheavals that Europe and the world experienced in the 20th century. These include the creation and destruction of borders and nation states, exterminations and the policies for reconstruction or resettlement after World War II. This in turn leads to re-reading the phasing of the Shoah, no longer at the level of the decision-makers, but of victims, dispersed over a set of territories. It gives history a biographical thickness. The sequencing is defined chronologically from the point of view of the people who experienced both the migratory episodes and the different stages of anti-Semitic persecution.

From an epistemological point of view, this project tends to demonstrate the heuristic advantages of a history of exile, written at the level of individuals. It compares simultaneously and exhaustively individuals of the same origin in the twenty or so different countries to which have migrated. In this way, the project seeks to contribute to the renewal of the global history of migration, based on a "case approach".

Reconstructing trajectories as a team

The project is being carried out by a team, with each of its members covering a fixed area. Franciszek Zakrzewski is examining most closely the social and ethnic issues of the city of Lubartów in the interwar period, as part of a PhD devoted to the relationships between Jews and non-Jews between 1921 and 1945.

He helped to set out the initial framework, which was also supported by an exhaustive examination of the town's population register in 1932. Thomas Chopard is focusing on migration east of Poland, and particularly to the USSR. By being able to study the 200 Lubartówians who managed to survive, he provides an understanding of an experience of mobility spread out over several years: first, from Poland to the multiple confines of the USSR, before for many persons then returned to Poland, to migrate again subsequently. Such experiences are ultimately poorly-known and often lost into the broader categories that obliterated the Soviet era or Jewish specificities. These include the forcible displacement or evacuation by the Soviet authorities during the War, the experiences of Holocaust survivors, of displaced persons or Polish citizens. Adèle Sutre is looking west, tracing more precisely the trajectories of migrants towards the Americas of nearly 300 people whose names can be found on passenger lists boarding for the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico or Costa Rica.

The systematic analysis of databases provided by genealogy sites has helped to circumvent, in part, the difficulties of access to archives related to the pandemic. These websites provide access to billions of digitised and indexed archival documents around the world that allow us to identify hundreds of individuals who were born or who resided in Lubartów and subsequently left Europe.

While ensuring the coordination of the project, I am also personally in charge of studying the migrations of Lubartówians who passed through France. By crossing different sets of sources, such as naturalization files, registrations in the Seine business register (i.e. the business register for central Paris), or lists of convoys and files on spoliation under the Vichy regime, I am seeking to reconstruct their migratory paths and the trajectories of Jewish migrants' persecution. Fleeing Poland did not mean people were able to survive the Shoah, as nearly half of the Lubartów natives exiled to France in the interwar period were deported. This transnational approach makes it possible to shed light on the variety of migratory paths as well as that of trajectories of persecution.

Individuals and collectives, between migration and persecution

The project reflects the rhythms of these migrations, but above all the links between those who left and those who remained. It allows us to show how diasporic links were established, but also how they were broken, before, during and after the Shoah. The research seeks to examine the determinants of persecution, fitting them into their collective dimension.

In this way, the project intends to contribute to the work on the diasporas of exiles, by studying networks between migrants of the same origin, in a diachronic and dynamic perspective: Were resources shared between the inhabitants of Lubartów? How did news and information circulate, and in what time frames? One aspect of this survey is to reflect on the effects of interpersonal relationships on the behaviour of victims of persecution.

This leads to the question, which is highly controversial in the historiography of the Shoah, of "who knew what?" among the victims, for which we can study here the flow of information between them. This perspective is not trivial. By focusing on these collective determinants and seeking to define the range of possibilities available to victims, the project seeks to shed light on how actions and behaviours were not the sole result of what isolated individuals did, even in extreme situations. To this end, we explore the role played by hometown societies of Jewish immigrants (the so-called *landsmanshaftn*). One was created in Paris, the other in New York. Their archives are held by the current representatives of these associations. Accordingly, a new ethnographic dimension of the project consists in meeting descendants, to collect their testimonies and to access archives.

This research also sheds light on the overall history of ordinary relations between individuals and state administrations. Can transnational connections be observed in the development of anti-Semitic and xenophobic legislation? The monitoring of individual paths involves considering the role of administrations which sometimes were not specifically in charge of anti-Semitic discrimination, like police services responsible for foreigners, ordinary courts or naturalization services.

In this way, the research contributes to laying the groundwork for a transnational history of the identification of migrant populations in the world of the first half of the 20th century, at the grass roots and global levels. By reconstructing comprehensively the cross-border routes taken by these women and men, it is possible to study concretely the diversity of national practices of how foreign populations were managed, and how anti-Semitic discrimination was implemented. This involves looking at the effects on persons' individual and collective paths.

The project is characterized by strong inter-connections, linked to the specific, personal trajectories of the people we follow. Thus, while Thomas located Naftal Cyngiel, in the USSR between 1939 and 1945, where he fled to escape extermination, Franek found him again in

> ❝ It involves reconstructing, one-by-one, entire individual trajectories of all the Jewish inhabitants of this small Polish town, from the beginning of 1920s through to the 1950s, whether they emigrated or remained, whether they were exterminated or survived the Shoah. ❞

Lubartów in 1946 when he returned to Poland, and Adèle document-ed his emigration to the United States in 1951. The accumulation of sources on individual paths allows us to study the variety of ways persons stated they national, confessional, but also professional affil-iations across countries, statuses and lived experiences.

As persons changed their names, first names, dates of birth, as well as confessions...it may be asked what room for manoeuvre they had in face-to-face meetings with administrations. One of the main chal-lenges of this project is to question these margins of manoeuvre, according to territories and moments. This issue is both historical and epistemological, as well as being eminently contemporary.

Quantified ethnography

By looking at a group of more than 3,000 people, this project explores original quantitative techniques. The exhaustive archival reconstruc-tion of the trajectories of the victims of anti-Semitic persecution during the first half of the 20th century entails meeting different chal-lenges: the mass of documents collected, the geographical and multi-lingual fragmentation of sources (Yiddish, Hebrew, Polish, Spanish, French, English, Portuguese, etc.); the difficulty of gathering homo-geneous and comparable information from many sources, which were produced during distinct phases of the persecution process, and in different contexts; and finally the methodological challenge.

Gathering sources of a varied nature from all over the world, follow-ing the course of biographical itineraries, in fact amounts to overcom-ing all "methodological nationalism".

One of the contributions of this project is to show that migrations were organized within complex systems, as migration trajectories very often take non-linear directions.

For example, we found the traces of a couple who emigrated to Palestine in 1933, but who then returned to Lubartów in 1938; or a woman who arrived in France in 1931, who survived World War II, but then decided to leave for New York, in 1947. The context of diasporic migration has been the subject of stimulating research by geographers and sociologists, who have been able to proceed through knowledge networks between migrants of the same origin. By contrast, our approach highlights the successive locations of indi-viduals in several countries that are often distant.

The methodological challenge is to build consistent databases, with-out crushing the variety and singularity of individuals' migration and persecution routes, or indeed omitting relationships between individuals. Anton Perdoncin is coordinating this project. Several master's students are also helping out from time to time, thanks to ethnographic data capture experiments, discoveries of new sourc-es such as applications for identity cards in Poland or death certifi-cates at Auschwitz, and family monographs, or by reconstructing the kinship networks between Lubartówians.

Anton and Pierre Mercklé have created a special function in the software programme R used here, which has a barbaric name (*soun-

dex Daitch-Mokotov), but makes it possible to manage the changing spellings of surnames and first names from one archive to another. But it is very promising, since it allows correspondences to be established between the sets of sources, in order to try to identify individuals, from one archive to another.

The project is original in as far as it adopts a variety of quantitative methods to identify persons' itineraries. In addition to classical quantitative methods (correspondence analysis and logistic regressions), we are experimenting with different tools to describe and analyse complex longitudinal information. These methods make it possible to compare migration patterns and types of persecution, and to explain them by a variety of factors, such as marital status, family structures, professions, migratory episodes or legal statuses.

These methods raise new questions. Do the links extend through time and space? At what cost and with what types of resources did individuals manage to maintain relationships remotely? Does the density of networks have an effect on the trajectories of persecution?

The project is exciting, but its difficulties should not be minimized. On top of the fatigue inherent in the European Research Council work in dealing with Gantt chart management and other kill-joy tasks like grasping Kafkaesque bureaucratic formalities, we have had to deal with the Covid-19 crisis, and then with archives, libraries and borders that are now closed due to the war in Ukraine. However, our research paths have also taken unexpected directions, including oral history research, the collection of testimonies and family archives. In January 2020, during a visit to Israel, I had the chance to meet Mordechai Rozbruch, born in 1924 in Lubartów. And thanks to the project's website, we have been contacted by several dozen descendants of Lubartówiens. More (hi)stories will follow… ⬢

> **This leads to the question, which is highly controversial in the historiography of the Shoah, of "who knew what?" among the victims, for which we can study here the flow of information between them.**

Learn more about the Lubartworld project
https://lubartworld.cnrs.fr/le-projet/

Tax Exile Versus Legitimate Taxation

In recent years, people have left France for England, Belgium, Switzerland or even Portugal, for example, for tax reasons. Should they be seen as tax exiles being pushed to leave by constraints exerted on France's very rich, as the dominant discourse often implies?[1] When France's tax system is finding it more difficult to finance public expenditure and reduce inequalities, the nature of the relationship between the tax authorities and taxpayers, along with the principles of the fair distribution of the tax burden must therefore be questioned.

Jean-Marie Monnier

Emeritus Professor of Economics and Member of the Sorbonne Economics Centre

Translated by
Nicholas Sowels

ince Antiquity, tax avoidance has been common, as peasants left their land to make themselves inaccessible to taxes.[2] Later, tax avoidance by "force of inertia" or the self-restraint in production were collective means to avoid taxes, which tax strikes in the 20th century perpetuated. There is thus nothing new about recent forms of withdrawing for tax reasons by well-known artists or wealthy people. However, this is now accompanied by an anti-tax discourse which tends to legitimise the refusal to pay tax, and which must therefore be analysed.

According to this argument, the rich are persecuted due to the excessively redistributive distortions of public policy. Such distortions are held to lead to confiscatory levels of taxation, while persons who bear the highest levels of taxation receive little from their contributions. Drawing more or less directly on the ideas of Frédéric Bastiat, the main point is that tax is fully legitimate only if the State returns to taxpayers approximately as much as it takes away from them, in the form of services. Distortion is therefore caused by tax progressiveness, which is seen to result from misunderstanding equality.[3] Only proportionality is therefore coherent with the ideals of democracy.

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1 The term "tax exil" is used widely in the press, but also sometimes by tax experts and economists (for an example in the press, see Cécilia Brassier-Rodrigues and Françoise Cognard, "Le rôle de la presse française dans la promotion du régime fiscal de 'résident non habituel' portugais", *Communicator*, No.24, 2018, pp. 37-57).

2 Highlighted by tax historians, such as Laurianne Martinez-Seve, "La fiscalité séleucide : bilan et perspectives de recherches", *Topoi, Orient-Occident*, Supplement 6, 2004, p. 81-104.

3 A tax is said to be progressive when it increases proportionally faster than the value of what is taxed.

All this not only questions the nature of the relationship between the tax authorities and the individual taxpayers in a democratic society like France, but it also questions of the status of progressiveness in the tax system.

There is no market contract between the State and each individual taxpayer

In early thinking on taxes, two concepts quickly opposed each other: the benefit principle and the ability-to-pay principle. The former establishes a direct link between expenditures and public resources, because taxpayers benefit from State action. Accordingly, there must be some equivalence between their tax burden and the benefits they derive from public policy. From an economic point of view, tax could be regarded as the quasi-price of public services consumed by citizens. This benefit principle is therefore ultimately based on a contractual vision of the relationship between the State and taxpayers, who pay contributions, if not voluntary, at least in an individualised way and based on the public services consumed.

> **Since Antiquity, tax avoidance has been common, as peasants left their land to make themselves inaccessible to taxes.**

For its part, the ability-to-pay principle stems from the idea that it is necessary to disconnect resources from public expenditure in order to establish the taxpayers' tax burden. Taking account of ability-to-pay means that the levies must be proportionate, to an extent to be determined, to the abilities of taxpayers to pay as identified on the basis of their income, wealth or even consumption. Tax is therefore not linked to the benefits that citizens derive from public services, nor to an individuals' assessments of each person's capacity to finance the needs of the State. Instead, taxation proceeds from collective deliberation.

Though long dominant in tax thinking, the benefit principle gradually showed its limits, so that the ability-to-pay principle eventually prevailed. Accordingly, while consent is given to tax, it is not the direct consent of the individual taxpayer which is politically legitimate, but rather consent by the Nation's elected representatives.[4] If the tax is individualised by taking into account the ability-to-pay (income, family situation, etc.), then it is not a price resulting from an individual contract.

Progressiveness should avoid taxing subsistence earnings

Asking the twofold question of the relationship between the tax authorities and the taxpayers and the nature of taxation inevitably leads to questioning the legitimate principles of the fair distribution of the common burden. This is particularly true if we follow through the ability-to-pay principle. Indeed, if income is used to evaluate the

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4 (Translator's note) In France's political tradition since the Revolution (1789), members of the National Assembly are representatives of the Nation as a whole, and while they are elected in constituencies, they are not direct delegates of their constituency electors.

efforts that taxpayer can make, then when income is low (i.e. when it simply covers basic necessities), the individual's ability-to-pay is zero. Enlightenment thinkers, from Montesquieu to Condorcet and Rousseau, all perceived this consequence of the ability-to-pay principle. This is why they took up the ancient maxim that the portion of income which corresponds the necessities of life should not be taxed. Accordingly, Montesquieu considered that fair taxation is *not* proportional to income because everyone must get "equal physical necessities" that are exempt from taxation. This leads not only to taxation that has no direct link to the "tax price" of public services consumed by individuals, but also to progressive taxation. Forbonnais and especially Condorcet (1792) extended the ability-to-pay principle to progressive taxation.[5] Defining progressiveness in reference to proportionality, Condorcet showed that if a lump-sum personal allowance equal to the value of minimum living necessities is applied to all taxpayers' income, then a tax proportional to the ability-to-pay (i.e. the income share above the allowance) would be a progressive tax on all income. In other words, progressiveness is not only fair, but it is also legitimate in a democratic tax regime.

Two consequences can be deduced from Condorcet's demonstration and the arguments on tax by French thinkers of the Enlightenment. First, a strictly proportional tax system does not respect the exemption and is therefore not a legitimate tax on subsistence income. Second, only a progressive system can respect the subsistence minimum allowance and be legitimate, provided that the effective tax rates are really higher than the subsistence minimum.

However, if the legitimacy of progressive taxation is thus established, it is always possible for tax to be considered as confiscatory at top income levels, by the individuals concerned.

Who is overtaxed?

The total tax revenue rate (TTRR) is often used to provide evidence of confiscatory taxation in France, as France's TTRR is said to be the highest in Europe. This rate is obtained by taking the ratio (expressed as a percentage) between the sum of compulsory taxes levied by general government and GDP. However, this indicator is the subject of very frequent misuse because it is misunderstood, for several reasons. First, the TTRR is an aggregate of all the compulsory contributions paid in the economy to the general government, regardless of which agents are paying. It cannot therefore be interpreted as an individual tax rate nor even as an individual tax burden. Secondly, the TTRR depends a lot on the accounting practices used to calculate it. For example, some compulsory levies are not recorded if they are intended for private organisations. It also depends on national

> **From an economic point of view, tax could be regarded as the quasi-price of public services consumed by citizens.**

5 Condorcet, "Sur l'impôt progressif", in *Collection des principaux Économistes,* T. 14, Osnabrück, O. Zeller, [1792], re-published in 1847, p. 566–572.

choices about financing social protection. A health system financed by private insurance thus does not entail any compulsory levy. Yet these payments are a burden for persons who pay them and who cannot escape them without taking life-threatening risks. Finally, a third factor comes into play. The TTRR includes all compulsory levies, including those that some parts of government pay to other parts of government, since all are subject to compulsory levies. This has two important consequences. On the one hand, the market economy (the basis for calculating GDP) does not bear compulsory levies alone, since the non-market part of the economy (i.e. general government) also pays them. Strictly speaking, the TTRR should therefore be corrected. On the other hand, a degree of self-financing of taxes occurs because of the length of public financing channels. Overall, international comparisons are invalid if these factors are not taken into account.[6]

> **Their work shows that the richest taxpayers (the top 1%) generally face an overall level of taxation in France that is lower than that experienced by the poorest 10%. Similarly, the richest 5% face an overall tax rate that is lower than persons in the middle of the income distribution.**

To determine whether the rich are indeed subject to a confiscatory level of taxation, we must actually examine the distribution of taxation by income level. This has been done, for example, by the Council of Compulsory Levies (Conseil des Prélèvements Obligatoires) and the Institute of Public Policy (Institut des Politiques Publiques). Their work shows that the richest taxpayers (the top 1%) generally face an overall level of taxation in France that is lower than that experienced by the poorest 10%.[7] Similarly, the richest 5% face an overall tax rate that is lower than persons in the middle of the income distribution. This result is explained by the specificities of the French tax system, dominated by proportional or regressive taxes (respectively social security payments and VAT, etc.), whereas income tax plays a small role because of the multitude of tax exemptions that mainly benefit the rich. The virtual disappearance of France's wealth tax and the sharp reduction in taxation on capital income have accentuated this tax profile. Thus, it is inaccurate to claim that the rich are subject to a confiscatory taxation. Persons who are overtaxed are instead more at the bottom of the income distribution – in fact they are the poorest.

There is no such thing as a "tax exile"
The term "tax exile" is a misnomer, as exile implies a forced departure from the country of origin. The exact term should be "tax expatriate", since it follows from an unconstrained choice.

We cannot otherwise understand the behaviours underlying the expatriations observed in recent years. On the one hand, the distribution of expatriates is driven by countries whose tax policies aims precisely at attracting such persons. On the other hand, policies to

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6 For the details of these mechanisms, see Jean-Marie Monnier, *Les prélèvements obligatoires*, Paris, Economica, 1998.

7 All levies included (taxes, duties, social security contributions, etc.).

attract tax expatriates are one of the instruments used in tax competition between EU member countries. Taxation policy across the EU requires unanimous voting, so taxation has actually become an area in which countries compete fiercely through tax rules. Some have even become fully-fledged tax havens or favour capital transfers to more distant tax havens. Thus, tax expatriation consists in breaking free from national rules to benefit from this competitive game, by leaving one's country of origin. ⬢

Writing and Representing Exile: Edward Saïd and Bruno Catalano

How can the experience of exile be transcended by artistic creation? By enabling dialogue between the texts of Edward Saïd (1935-2003) and the sculptures of Bruno Catalano (born in 1960), thirty years apart, we are considering the way in which the painful experience of exile can be transformed by the artistic process. Both being forced to leave their native countries, and both connected to the banks of the Mediterranean, they conceive literature and art as forms of self-regeneration.

Emmanuelle Kalfon

Associate Professor in the Language Department at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University.

Translated by
Amanda Murphy

Between here and there: defining exile, the experience of being uprooted

In the beginning, there was exile, that of Adam and Eve driven out of heaven...It is with this sentence that the story of both Edward Saïd and Bruno Catalano's lives could begin: the former having left Palestine and the latter Morocco, their biographical trajectories have been marked by rupture: geographical rupture, with the displacement from one place to another; mental and psychological rupture, as well as temporal rupture, with the passage from one time period to another; and finally, rupture with a bygone past, with everything that used to be familiar and no longer is.

It is in this sense that Edward Saïd evokes the idea of discontinuity: "*Exile [...]is fundamentally a discontinuous state of being. Exiles are cut off from their roots, their land, their past.*"[1]

This discontinuity engenders a fragmentation of the self, as the sculpture by Bruno Catalano entitled *Fragments* illustrates.

Fragmentation is in fact at the heart of the work of the artisan sculptor, as he calls himself, and stems from his experience with exile. "*In my work, I am constantly seeking movement and to express my feelings, I take that inertia to bring the form and the wax into being. Coming myself from Morocco, I carried these suitcases full of memories which I depict so often. They do not only contain images; they also contain life, desire: my roots in movement.*"[2] ●●●

Right:
Bruno Catalano,
Van Gogh
(Galéries Bartoux).

1 Edward SAID, *Reflections on Exile*, Granta Books, 2001.

Born in Morocco, his last name means "originally from Catalonia", which is a reference to the historical migration of his family who traveled through Sicily before settling in Tunisia, then in Morocco. For Bruno Catalano, like for Edward Saïd, names are actual signs of the exile they have experienced and internalized as integral parts of their identities. His collection of sculptures, entitled *Les Voyageurs* [the Wanderers], literally gives body to the feeling of the breaking, tearing and fragmentation of the self, depicted by inner void. The artist thus evokes "*the presence of the void [that] resonated in [him] on spiritual and internal levels, as well as on sculptural and esthetic ones.*" [2].

In his Reflections on Exile, Edward Saïd summarizes the experience in the following way: "*Exile is life led outside habitual order. It is nomadic, decentered, contrapuntal; but no sooner does one get accustomed to it than its unsettling force erupts anew.*"

With a broken body and torn off arm, the wanderer, turning his back on the home port he is drifting away from, finds himself in an unstable position, the reflection of his precarious situation and of the dynamics created by walking. His body appears to be departing, heading toward an elsewhere. On the pedestal of the sculpture, we see a crack between the two feet, a mark of the movement of the wanderer who has left one place to reach another, which is reminiscent of the borders he will have to cross. Only his torn body serves to connect the two shores, just as the suitcase guarantees continuity between the two parts of his body and his soul. For the artist, the suitcase is highly symbolic, since "*it represents the weight of experience, of living, and very personal feelings like remorse and regrets. It also reflects an attitude: taking one's suitcase and leaving also means demonstrating courage and determination.*"

Similarly, the experience of exile, expressed theoretically and analytically by Edward Saïd, is "*the unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home: its essential sadness can never be surmounted.*" Finding oneself outside of one's home land, with no hope of returning, the exiled person experiences this as an uprooting, a shock, or even a physical dislocation. In his *Reflections on Exile*, Edward Saïd summarizes the experience in the following way: "*Exile is life led outside habitual order. It is nomadic, decentered, contrapuntal; but no sooner does one get accustomed to it than its unsettling force erupts anew.*" Decentering, belonging to the long-lost word and non-belonging to the host country are the origins of the perpetual discordance felt by the individual in exile. In addition to the loss of all geographical, physical, linguistic and cultural bearings, there is loss of identity and fragmentation of the self. Physical exile is therefore added to mental exile, the expression of the traumatic experience of forced departure, and of intrinsic suffering.

As if to echo Bruno Catalano's *Wanderers*, Edward Saïd also uses the image of the suitcase, emblematic of the exiled, "*excessively loaded [and] that with each departure, masks in fact the fear of not being able to*

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2 Bruno CATALANO, *Introspective*, Les Fransdaises, 2015.

return." [3] As much in the images they use as in the feelings expressed, resonances are revealed between the stories and the works of Edward Saïd and Bruno Catalano: in both cases, the suitcase evokes existential wandering.

A feeling of strangeness and of being a foreigner

Starting from the experience of departure, be it forced or not, Edward Saïd develops a "*sense of constant estrangement*" a feeling of permanent alienation wherever he found himself. Being a foreigner literally means not belonging to the national community, finding oneself excluded from it, because one comes from elsewhere. This expression can be interpreted in two ways: on the one hand, feeling like a foreigner, and on the other, being defined as a foreigner, not only not speaking the language, not having the codes, not knowing the habits and customs, but also finding oneself in an environment that is hostile because it is different.

Everything seems therefore strange, out of reach, incomprehensible. What follows is a loss of cultural and linguistic bearings, as well as a loss of identity. This is what is the most disturbing for those who are exiled. "*Being 'out of place,' or 'always in the wrong place' [...] is a leitmotif of Saïd's memoir*."

The rift or the fracture evoked earlier is illustrated here by Edward *Saïd*'s question when he evokes his own name, like an oxymoron symbolizing the profound rupture stemming from the exile within his own being: "*It took me about fifty years to become accustomed to, or, more exactly, to feel less uncomfortable with, "Edward", a foolishly English name yoked forcibly to the unmistakably Arabic family name Saïd. [...] But the rationale of my name broke down [...] when I tried to connect my fancy English name with its Arabic partner. [...] The one thing I could not tolerate, but very often would have to endure, was the disbelieving, and hence undermining, reaction: Edward? Saïd?*" [4] The feeling of alienation is therefore two-fold, both geographical and interior: the result is however similar since it brings about a feeling of remoteness and of non-belonging. This corroborates the conclusion at which Alexis Nuselovici arrives: "*The exilic experience is born out of a border crossing [...] every exile is an inner exile insofar as the experience, before affecting the displaced body, imprints the psychological sign of rupture, of the exclusion experienced above all within, an awareness before becoming a condition.*" This is the torn man that Bruno Catalano seeks to represent in his collection *The Wanderers*; his intention is to "*reveal the suffering that lies within the void*", as the sculptor himself explains. ●●●

> **However, those for whom return turns out to be impossible may be doomed to uncurable nostalgia and to a fixed identity built only around relentlessly idealized memories.**

3 Franca SINAPOLI, « Exil et réinvention de l'identité chez Edward W. Said » *Enthymema*, XIII, 2015.

4 Edward SAID, *Out of Place. A Memoir*, New York, Vintage Books, 1999.

Exile as the re-writing of the self

How are this rupture, the inner emptiness, and the feeling of nostalgia and of loss expressed in the works of exiled artists? For those who have experienced the fragmentation of identity due to exile, the physical return to the home country could be considered as the ultimate remedy to the wound caused by the uprooting. This return to the point of departure could thus suffice to reunite oneself with a full and whole original identity, enriched with the experience which, although traumatic, may be surpassed. However, those for whom return turns out to be impossible may be doomed to uncurable nostalgia and to a fixed identity built only around relentlessly idealized memories. Nostalgia for a lost, mythicized world, the memory of the home country becomes in itself a dream-like place, reconstructed through the work of memory. As such, like Alexandre-Garner and Keller-Privat write: "*the roads [...] of exile are often inscribed in loss and impossible mourning, turning imagination, language and memory into the ultimate dwelling space, turning literature into the last remaining space in which to anchor oneself, to write oneself in ink.*" [5]

> **"**
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> **Exile, as presented through the experiences and trajectories of Bruno Catalano and Edward Saïd, constitutes a painful ordeal, the stigmas of which can never be erased, but paradoxically, it is also a fruitful experience that can open up new territories, and forge the creation of a new identity and a new relationship to the world.**
>
> **"**

In fact, it is only after a long elaborative process and personal analysis that Edward Saïd, far from accepting a fractured identity or the position of the victim, was able to assert the fact that he belongs to no place, since "*when 'return' to his land and his origins might have been possible for Said, he had to acknowledge that he had actually positively devised his 'non-return' through a poetics of non-belonging and of non-possession of a place.*"

Edward Saïd completes a shift by refusing the stereotypes linked to the condition of the exiled. He emancipates himself from what characterizes every exiled person, that is, finding oneself caught between two realities that are difficult to reconcile, that of one's country of origin and that of the host country, and forges a new identity for himself. Always "*out of place*", out of the range, out of the framework, as if out of the center, he considers autobiographical writing to be an invention, a recreation of his identity, based on past experiences and memories, chosen moments that the author restructures and re-writes necessarily with reformulations and reinterpretations. Consequently, exile brings in a creative dimension and becomes a place of inspiration and writing. This reinvented place feeds into the personal fiction of the author: art becomes a shelter, a place of calm, of acceptance and of reconstruction. Shifting from a fragmented identity to a reinvented personal identity, the artist forges a metamorphosis, a kind of rebirth through the writing of exile or through the artistic representation of it, which allows him, ultimately, to apprehend the world differently.

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5 Alexandre GARNER et Keller PRIVAT, *Migrations, exils, errances et écritures*, Paris, Presses universitaires de Paris-Ouest, 2012, p. 5.

Exile, as presented through the experiences and trajectories of Bruno Catalano and Edward Saïd, constitutes a painful ordeal, the stigmas of which can never be erased, but paradoxically, it is also a fruitful experience that can open up new territories, and forge the creation of a new identity and a new relationship to the world. It is this new awareness that Albert Camus mentions in *Nuptials*: "*And never have I felt so deeply at one and at the same time so detached from myself and so present in the world*."[6] From then on, the initial uprooting, the feeling of loss as well as that of non-belonging become the steps in a progression leading to the reinvention of self-awareness that finds its expression through art. As such, representing and writing exile allows these artists to find a new place of belonging, their own and to rebuild themselves. ⬣

Edward Said (1935-2003)
Born in Jerusalem, in Mandatory Palestine, or Palestine under British mandate, he spent his youth between Jerusalem and Cairo, before having to leave for the United States in 1951. As a university professor, thinker and literary critic, this experience profoundly affected him.

Bruno Catalano (1960 -)
Born in Morrocco in 1960, he and his family were forced into exile in 1975. Living in Marseille since then, he has kept this experience of being uprooted close to mind.

6 ALBert CAMUS, "Nuptials" in *Lyrical and Critical Essays*, ed. P. Thory, trad. E. Conroy Kennedy 1970.

The Origins and Perspectives of Refugees in France

Compared to other migrants, those who have been down the path of forced exile have more difficulty integrating socio-economically in the country where they settle.[1] The most recent estimates reveal that the unemployment rate of refugees remains superior to that of other migrants with similar socio-demographic traits ten years after their arrival[2] and that the gap remains for twenty years when compared to natives (Müller et al., 2022). These difficulties speak, in particular, to the fact that people are less prepared when it comes to forced immigration, for example with respect to the destination and to their proficiency in the local language. They also reveal something about the distancing that comes with it – from education, employment, circles of friends and family – and about the mental and physical consequences stemming from the situation in the home country and the experiences they have gone through during exile.[3] In France, the characteristics of forced exiles remain however little known compared to in neighboring countries where more statistical data dedicated to it is available.[4]

Benjamin Michallet

Postdoctoral Fellow
at PSE-Paris School
of Economics

Hillel Rapoport

Professor of Economics
at the Sorbonne School
of Economics
and PSE-Paris School
of Economics

Translated by
Amanda Murphy

he study *Origins and Perspectives of Refugees in France* [*Origines et Perspectives of Réfugiés en France*] (OPReF) was completed by the Paris School of Economics [l'École d'Économie de Paris[5]] in order to establish national statistics on the diversity of refugee populations in metropolitan France (not including Corsica) who have obtained asylum and who are therefore Beneficiaries of International Protection (BIP). Administered between November 2020 and April 2021 in 9 languages in 378 centers chosen randomly from a representative sample of the refugee population hosted under asylum, the OPReF study has allowed for a better understanding of the original socio-economic traits and the reasons for departure of the 2,632 people sampled, from their path to admission under asylum in France and their health issues, to their aspirations. With its description of the specific situation of BIPs

1 FASANI F., FRATTINI T. and MINALE L., "Lift the Ban? Initial Employment Restrictions and Refugee Labour Market Outcomes", *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 19(5), 2021, p. 2803-2854.

2 FASANI F., FRATTINI T. and MINALE L., "(The struggle for) refugee integration into the labour market: Evidence from Europe", *Journal of Economic Geography*, 22(2), 2022, p. 351-393.

3 BRELL C., DUSTMANN C. and PRESTON I., "The labor market integration of refugee migrants in high-income countries", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 34(1), 2020, p. 94-121.

4 Since 2016, the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) has introduced a complementary module allowing for the longitudinal tracing of a representative sample of refugees. This study (IAB-BAMF-SOEP) is coupled with employment data on the individual level.

5 The study is funded by the Direction Générale des Étrangers en France (DGEF) and the Institut Convergence Migration (ICM).

hosted under asylum, the study is the most comprehensive ever conducted in France on this category of people.

Across the world, the number of refugees evolves alongside the indicators of conflicts, which have been increasing since 2011.[6] In this context, most of the respondents in the OPReF study indicated that they had fled war or that danger was the reason for their departure, the second reason given being discrimination in their country of origin and the poor personal and economic living conditions. With the exception of Syrians, a large majority of the respondents declared that they had no network upon arrival, which attests to the lack of precise destination at the time of departure. Few respondents mentioned family reasons as the reason for leaving [Figure 1].

More than half of the BIPs hosted under asylum are originally from Afghanistan or Sudan,[7] two countries marked by long periods of conflict during the 2010s, followed by Guinea, Ivory Coast, Syria, Eritrea and Somalia, countries, for the most part, that have been affected by armed conflicts or political instability throughout the last decade.

Despite their decisive nature, the experiences exiled people overcome along the way remain particularly poorly understood, even though the conditions of the journey and its length affect physical heath, mental health and the human capital of those who undertake it. The part of the study dedicated to the risks run during the journey shows that more than two-thirds of the respondents were victims of physical attacks, pecuniary fraud or extortion, imprisonment, theft, bribery, sexual harassment ●●●

> **Across the world, the number of refugees evolves alongside the indicators of conflicts, which have been increasing since 2011.**

6 HATTON T. J., "Refugees, asylum seekers, and policy in OECD countries", *American Economic Review*, 106(5), 2016, p. 441–445.

7 Afghanistan: 32 %; Sudan: 11 %; Guinea: 7 %; Ivory Coast: 4 %; Syria: 4 %; Eritrea: 4 %; Somalia: 4 %; et 78 other nationalities at less than 4 %.

|	
Fleeing war, fleeing danger	66,4%
Discrimination (ethnic or religious, etc.)	30,2%
Poor living conditions (personal and economic)	13%
I do not wish to reply	12%
Expulsion or deportation	9,7%
Your family sent you away	3,9%
You wanted to go where your family members were	2,2%
Because members of your family/friends/ acquaintances had left the country	2%
No reply	5,6%

Figure 1 Fleeing war or danger is the most common reason for leaving

Reading: 66% of people questioned declared fleeing war as one of the reasons for their departure (several responses possible)

Sex ■ Men ■ Women

Figure 2 Refugees: a young, more masculine group Reading: Distribution by age and sex of the people having replied to the survey

or shipwreck! We find great heterogeneity in function of gender and nationality, which explains in part the time period and the paths taken during the migration: the majority of the respondents originally from Ivory Coast or Eritrea say they were imprisoned, an experience related by less than 30% of the respondents of other nationalities, while 20% of female respondents tell of harassment or sexual violence, compared to 8% of male respondents. The complexity and the dangers associated with exile are reflected in the traits of the study's sample. It is, for the most part, a young group of people, under 35 and male[8] [Figure 2]. The Afghani, Eritrean and Sudanese respondents are predominantly male (up to 90% of the Sudanese respondents). Those from Guinea and Syria are around 40% women. The Ivory Coast is an exception with a majority of women (60%). Women are more highly educated, 22% having reached post-secondary studies as opposed to 13% of men. The differences between nationalities are also very significant: it reflects both the difference in the development of these countries and the specificities of their education systems. Brücker *et al.*[9] highlights that the proportion of exiled people having complet- ed their studies decreases with the length of armed conflicts, which is

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8 68 % of respondents to the questionnaire were men compared to 48% of the French population. 78% of men and 68% of women were 35 or under (compared to 40% and 41% in all of France) and only 8% of respondents are over 45 (compared to 47% in all of France).

9 BRUCKER H., JASCHKE P. and KOSYAKOVA Y., *Integrating Refugees and Asylum Seekers into the German Economy and Society: Empirical Evidence and Policy Objectives*, Washington (DC), Migration Policy Institute, 2019.

particularly pertinent in the case of Afghanistan. In our study, Afghans are over-represented among the respondents who have no degree. A majority of respondents indicated that they understood French "fairly well," which indicates that many refugees are from French-speaking countries or that they have acquired a certain proficiency in the language while waiting to obtain their status.

When asked about their priorities, the respondents evoked above all their families, followed by access to housing and employment. They gave importance to the need to find a job that they like, at which they excel and that provides a decent wage. Access to employment remains nonetheless very difficult: though they were 3.2% on average to have declared being on unemployment in their country of origin, this rate rose to 38.4% at the time of the study, a fairly consistent conclusion regardless of country of origin. However, overall, the respondents seem to have a certain optimism when they imagine themselves five years from now [Figure 3] and declare, for the most part, rarely having the feeling of being worthless, desperate, nervous or depressed. We observe a self-declared improvement in health between their situation during the six months preceding exile and the time of the study. Lastly, a large majority of respondents declare that they want to remain definitively in France. ⬡

> **Despite their decisive nature, the experiences exiled people overcome along the way remain particularly poorly understood, even though the conditions of the journey and its length affect physical heath, mental health and the human capital of those who undertake it.**

The date from the *Origins and Perspectives of Refugees in France* (*OPReF*) survey will be made available to researchers during the second half of 2022, on the website of the Paris School of Economics under the page "Open data"


Figure 3 Optimism declared over the course of the survey (on a scale of 1 to 10)
Reading: the people questioned indicated their level of optimism on a scale of 0 to 10 at three points in time. 38% had no optimism before their departure and 58% were extremely optimistic about the next 5 years to come.

One month before leaving   Currently   In 5 years

Syrian Refugees in Türkiye: Deconstructing Rumours of "High" Fertility

Türkiye is one of the world's top countries welcoming forcibly displaced persons. In 2022, there were about 4 million exiles, a vast majority being Syrian and to a lesser extent Iraqi or Afghan.[1]

Celio Sierra-Paycha
Associate Professor of Demography, and Doctor in Geography; Member of the Demography Institute of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University (IDUP) and of the Research Centre of the Demography Institute of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University (CRIDUP)

Leila Fardeau
PhD student of Demography at the French Institute of Demographic Studies (INED)

Armelle Andro
Professor of Demography at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University and Head of the Public Health Directorate of the City of Paris

Ilgi Bozdag
PhD student of Demography and Member of the Research Centre of the Demography Institute of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University (CRIDUP) and of the Demography Institute of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University (IDUP)

Translated by
Nicholas Sowels

In response to the massive arrivals of refugees since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, the Turkish government set up a system providing temporary residence permits with access to health care and education for Syrians, as of 2013. Following the agreement between Türkiye and the European Union (EU) signed in March 2016, EU has committed to pay €6 billion to Türkiye to contribute to wellbeing of hosted refugees in Türkiye, with a condition of limiting passage to the European Union. In addition to this primary humanitarian assistance, many other national and international organisations have contributed to these aid mechanisms. The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) has thus become the most important humanitarian programme in the history of the European Union. As of December 2016, more than 1.7 million refugees were living in Türkiye and receiving monthly financial assistance from EU funds, in close collaboration with the UN World Food Programme,[2] the Turkish Red Crescent, and Turkish government institutions.[3]

From a legal point of view, the status of the Syrian refugees on Turkish soil has not been framed by the refugee status set out in the Geneva Convention, but by an alternative, so-called "temporary protection" status, designed in response to this massive influx of exiles.[4] Other forcibly displaced persons such as Afghans or Iraqis have access to international protection which is subject to rejection as opposed to temporary protection. There are also 'refugees' as status in line with Geneva Convention.

The ESSN programme covers essential needs of households and individuals identified as vulnerable, regardless of their status (temporary, international or refugee protection) in Türkiye. Each beneficiary of the program receives a debit card with 120 Turkish lira (TRY) loaded monthly for each family member, so that households can provide for their basic

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1 According to data from the Directorate General for Migration Administration (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü), consulted on 27 June 2022.

2 From December 2016 to March 2020, ESSN was managed by the World Food Programme. Since April 2020, it has been managed by the International Federation of the Red Cross.

3 Emergency Social Safety Net: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/essn_fr

4 This is the same mechanism that has been put in place within the EU since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

needs according to their actual needs, whether to buy petrol, pay rent, bills, school fees for children or health care expenses. For example, a family of two parents and three children receives about TRY700, €111[5] per month, including monthly top-ups.[6]

Families must meet certain criteria related to the structure of thehousehold to benefit from the ESSN humanitarianaid. There are a total of six demographic criteria and one of them is dependency ratio equal to or greater than 1.5: the dependency defined as the number of household members under 18 years, over 60 years or any member with disabilities, divided by the number of people aged from 18 to 59 years. According to this criterion, an adult couple with three children would meet the demographic criteria to benefit from ESSN. The latter criterion has been particularly criticised by a part of Turkish public opinion, notably by the republican opposition to Erdoğan's government. [7] Among the criticisms made of the agreements with the EU, one argues that the programme has a perverse effect on the fertility of the refugees, encouraging them to have more children to benefit from financial aid, and hence increasing the fertility rates of the refugee population. ●●●

> **The ESSN programme covers essential needs of households and individuals identified as vulnerable, regardless of their status (temporary, international or refugee protection) in Türkiye.**

5 Based on the 2019 exchange rate.

6 In addition to the TRY120 pounds per person, there is a quarterly supplement of TRY600 for families with 1 to 4 members, TRY300 for families with 5 to 8 members, and TRY100 for families with 9 or more members. The relative support for smaller families is more important as they are considered to be more vulnerable (often single-parent and/or less economically-integrated), and to take into account economies of scale.

7 For example, in the following press article: https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2022/yazarlar/murat-muratoglu/turkiyede-dogan-754-000-suriyeli-7032117/amp/.

Thanks to the ESSN card, families of refugees can purchase what they need the most.

© WFP /Deniz Akkus.

© WFP /Deniz Akkus.

Nearly 1.5 million refugees living in Turkey receive monthly aid in cash thanks for the humanitarian financial efforts of the EU.

At the request of the World Food Programme, the Research Centre of the Institute of Demography of the Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University (CRIDUP) conducted a study in 2019 to assess the real impact of this humanitarian assistance on the fertility behaviour of Syrian families.[8] The methodology was based on an econometric study of the differences in fertility between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of ESSN, combined with a qualitative study using focus group discussions with more than a hundred refugees in different Turkish cities.

The econometric study used a comparison of fertility indicators between ESSN beneficiaries and non-recipients of ESSN to test the hypothesis that non-recipients would have more children, in order to become eligible for the programme. According to critics of the programme, non-beneficiary couples who already have two children decide to have a third child to comply with the eligibility criteria for aid. In reality, the results showed that the probability of having a child was *lower* among non-beneficiaries, thus rejecting this misconception. Yet, they also show that the delay between the birth of the second and third children is shorter for non-beneficiaries than for beneficiaries. An incentive effect of aid on fertility does indeed exist which can be seen more as a "windfall effect" rather than as a "perverse incentive effect". The programme does not lead families to have more children to become a beneficiary, but encourages families to have the third child more quickly than otherwise.

8 Celio Sierra-Paycha, Leila Fardeau, Ilgi Bozdag and Armelle Andro (2020), T*he impact of Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Targeting Criteria on the Fertility Decisions of Applicants*, report commissioned by the United Nations World Food Programme, 58 p.

Contrary to the common representations, the results show that the fertility of Syrian families has declined overall since the beginning of the conflict. This declining trend has two explanations related topopulation dynamics. Firstly,, there is no doubt that part of the decline is attributable to a long-term trend associated with the demographic transition of Syrian society, which began in the mid-1970s.[9] Secondly, this can be linked to recent developments such as dramatic economic stagnation of the 2010s: violence linked to Syrian conflict, forced displacement, the downgrading and decline in living standards, as well as the lack of confidence in the future have probably led some of Syrians to postpone or abandon their plans to have children.

It still remains true that, despite this overall decline in fertility rates among the Syrian population, the average number of children per woman among these families remains higher than 2.1 children per woman, which is observed among Turkish women. This could lead to bias in the perception among host community. This bias has already led part of Turkish public opinion to attribute the reason for large number of children in Syrian families to benefit from the humanitarian aid programme, rather than to differences in fertility behaviour,[10] linked to Türkiye's more advanced demographic transition than Syria's.

The demographic characteristics – in particular fertility rates – of the populations benefiting from this assistance may be seen as a strategy to benefit from the ESSN assistance. However, these families are subject demographic dynamics which are changing over time, regardless of the existence of programmes to assist these vulnerable populations.

The analyses of qualitative data collected from refugees during focus group discussions confirm the hypothesis of a decline in fertility caused by forced displacement. They show that the ideal number of children has decreased since the war for most., even thoughthis number is still above the average Turkish fertility rate. The testimonies collected during these collective interviews converge on the observation of a change in norms and practices caused by exile, which was widely shared by the men and women who were interviewed. The main difference on ideas is on how permanent these changes on fertility behaviour will be. Women seem more convinced that they will continue to have fewer children than before, thanks to a certain empowerment acquired in Türkiye. By contrast, men are more conservative and attribute this new situation to temporary economic difficulties, seeing it as a reversible phenomenon. This study shows that, in this context of forced migration, political violence and exile, gender norms are likely to be reconfigured, and changes in fertility will perhaps become more permanent. ⬢

> **An incentive effect of aid on fertility does indeed exist which can be seen more as a "windfall effect" rather than as a "perverse incentive effect".**

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9 The demographic transition refers to a process of decreasing mortality followed by a decrease in fertility and birth rate, which has been observed gradually in all countries of the world since the 18ᵀᴴ century.

10 Ilgi Bozdag, Celio Sierra-Paycha, and Armelle Andro (2022), "Temporary Adjustment or Normative Change? Fertility and Marriage Preferences of Syrian Refugees in Turkey in the Context of Forced Migration", *Frontiers in Human Dynamics*, 3-10-3389.

"Journey into the Uncertain"
The Emotional Map of a Ukrainian Exile in France

Anna, a Ukrainian exile in France, goes through her path from the outskirts of Borova, in the region of Kiev, to Vincennes, outside of Paris. The document she has produced is the matrix for a story of exile in the feminine, of which we have published here some excerpts translated from Russian by Kristina Matrosova.

Ségolène Débarre

Associate Professor of Geography and Member of the Laboratory Géographie-Cités (UMR 8504). Translation from Russian by Kristina Matrosova, PhD Candidate at the Laboratory Géographies-Cités, ANR RECORDS

Translated by
Amanda Murphy

The word "exile" does not exist in Russian or in Ukrainian, it's untranslatable…" This is how our encounter with Anna, currently benefiting from temporary protection after arriving in Paris on April 3, 2022, began. Anna does not speak French or English, so the interview is conducted in Russian. *"My story is very atypical. We were very lucky, our journey was pretty smooth, without difficulty. There are people who had to wait more than two weeks in Lviv before getting to the border."*

Anna lived with her husband and their son in the small village near Borava, a town located 40 kilometers from Kiev. *"We were happy. We didn't need to be 'liberated'."* With two recognized professions, they were well off financially. The war in the Donbass seemed far away: *"It was abstract."* Since 2017, though, they had become friends with the family of one of their son's classmates from Donetsk: *"The five of them lived in a small, run-down space even though six months before the war, they had bought a house: they had left everything behind after a missile fell on the playground of a preschool."* This relationship brought the war closer to Borava, but not close enough to imagine large-scale invasion: *"War cannot happen!!!"*, she writes on the left side of her map.

Anna takes time to draw her trajectory with the pencils we give her and, even more so, to reveal her emotions. She is confused by the exercise: *"Geography in France is nothing like it is in Ukraine!"* We encourage her to freely associate words with the places she left and then with the places of exile, guided by the principle of emotional maps [see inset]. Borova is the place of *"happiness,"* of the *"job she loved,"* of the *"forest"* and the *"home,"* the place *"of provisions and seeds to plant, left to loved ones who stayed behind."* On the drawing, it's the place we'll go back to "when the war is over" – if it's over, because a question mark leaves room for doubt. Conversely, the places crossed through during the journey are associated with *"uncertainty," "with the memory of loved ones left behind"* and with the idea of *"danger threatening family."* Paris and Vincennes, the places where she was welcomed and places to settle in are associated with *"foreign country,"* and *"war"* and wanting to *"go back home."* The state of the sky is what allows her to express what she feels and to give us a more sincere glimpse into the pain of

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"Voyage into the uncertain" -- emotional map created by Anna on June 6, 2022 in Paris. Legend (from left to right): "War can not happen!!!"; Borova: "When will the war end?"; Kiev: "Uncertainty"; Warsaw: "Kindness, care, friendly support"; Berlin: "Warm welcome, help"; Hanover, Karlsruhe: "Very long road to friends"; Paris, Vincennes: "Saddness, no pleasure".

exile. On February 24, 2022, the first day of the Russian army offensive, she woke up early: "*The sky was covered with planes. My husband thought that the shots we heard were coming from the forest, that they were from hunters. For three days, we were completely in denial. We didn't think that that could be reality. They had both grandmothers come from Kiev: an 8-drive to get to their house as opposed to 30-minutes normally. We got organized with the neighbors: we bought big bags of flour and sugar and stocked up on sausage and cheese…People took shelter at our house before going further west. We took in a family, then another, a total of 12-13 people. I spent about the first two weeks running the house without watching the news. It was only when the two families left for Lviv that I realized that it was actually war. […] I was scared, but I also had a lot of hope that the war would be short.*"

There was no military presence in the village, but ten kilometers away, fighting over the control of a railway junction could regularly be observed. "*The windows were shaking. It was scary, but it was okay. We were mostly afraid that shrapnel would fall on the house.*" Leave? But where to go? "*Half of Ukraine was already in Lviv. The trains were jammed: there were 10 to 12 people in the compartments normally intended for four. And we didn't have a car. Even in Lviv, it was hard to find housing. And Lviv could also be bombed. No one was expecting us anywhere. We were afraid, but we felt like it would be worse elsewhere.*" My husband made the decision to leave the country when his French colleagues offered to take him in. "*Whether I wanted to or not, we were going to leave. It was important for him. And our Ukrainian salaries were limited. We didn't have much left with which to face rising prices and we realized that we wouldn't be able to live.*" On the map, Anna associates their departure from Borova with night. No neighbor wanted to take the risk of taking them to Kiev by car. They got on the road before sunrise. By chance, the regional train, which passes through irregularly, was coming into the station that morning. In the capital, checks were reinforced, but her husband, with his certificate of invalidity, was not on the list of mobilized men. The former Soviet train offered better travel conditions than the other trains: there were only three people per compartment, but no beds and nothing to drink. For the first four hours, the train moved slowly, with the blinds down and the lights off in order to avoid being the target of airstrikes. At the border, no Ukrainian customs officials. Only the Poles were checking entries. Then volunteers came into the wagons: "*They gave us food, drinks, and games for the kids. We didn't ask for anything, it was touching.*"

The sun was shining over Warsaw. But it was deceiving. Though the welcome was warm and the relief of being out of the country dominated, the war was nonetheless never off of our minds. "*Up until Warsaw, we were afraid, of course, but it was a tangible fear. We had learned to distinguish different noises, those of the Ukrainian armed forces, those of the Russian armed forces; the days were marked by the sirens, especially at night. We got used to them. When, in Warsaw, an ambulance came through*

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> **We were happy.
> We didn't need to
> be 'liberated'.**
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with its flashing lights on, I thought at first that it was an alarm. Then I realized that we were far from Ukraine and that I was feeling a danger that was no longer 'concrete'." From Warsaw, Anna and her family took the train to Berlin. "*Starting in Berlin, time felt long to me, because I had nothing to do: I had time and the possibility of watching the news. It was then that I realized that I was not going to be going back anytime soon. Starting in Berlin, my feeling was of total darkness. I didn't know if it was night or day. Everything was a blur and I still have a hard time putting words to what I felt. We arrived in Paris in the middle of the night, after changing twice* [in Hanover and Karlsruhe, see map]. *I can't say that we were happy. We were exhausted…* […] *Since then, I live with dark images.*

On Vincennes, I can't put sunshine. The storms last weekend woke me up during the night. We don't have such intense storms in Ukraine. I felt like there were bombings going on. I live with a feeling of danger from a distance for the people who stayed behind. It was really only here that I realized that it was war. I would really like to go back to Ukraine. But I know that we would not have the necessary resources to go back and live there. At the beginning, were told ourselves that we would go back in six months at the latest. But we soon understood that it could last for years. Only one thing is sure: if we go back one day, it will be on a very fast track… by plane!" Just the opposite of this "journey into the uncertain." ◗

> 66
> **The state of the sky is what allows her to express what she feels and to give us a more sincere glimpse into the pain of exile.**
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⊗ How to map exile?

Over the past few years, research in geography has proposed new ways of mapping migrations. These approaches have in common the fact that they challenge the conventional and supposedly neutral cartography of migratory flows, which simplifies them to the extreme and represents them by neat arrows that come together very approximately, and can fuel the rhetoric of threat and invasion. Some of these publications, calling us to "beware of maps", have revealed recurrent bias in representation and offered new semi-ological graphics [Bahoken and Lambert, 2020; Lambert and Zanin, 2019]. Others have insisted on the need to abandon overly linear representations of migratory trajectories, since they are usually composed of multiple detours, back and forth movements, hesitations, and long waits full of uncertainty [Lagarde, 2020]. Contrary to abstract and disincarnated "stock and flow" representations, mapping experiments emerged at the cross-roads between art and social sciences. Falling within the field of mind maps and participa-tive cartography [Palsky, 2013], these "emotional maps" aim to build with the interviewees a spatial translation of the emotions linked to the spaces they have crossed through [Mekdjian and Amilhat Szary, 2015; Mekdjian

and Olmédo, 2016]. The materials (paper, as well as cloth, clay and sand…) have to allow for the mediation of the stories and should help document often traumatized voices in an accessible way. Since traditional semiological mapping can not apprehend exile (since nothing allows us to distinguish the trajectory of exile from other types of migration), emotional maps allow us to document the emotions connected to uprooting and disorientation that make up its essence. These representations can take on a great variety of forms, often looking more like drawings than actual maps, and can reach many different types of actors.

Example of a map on "The Exiles of Paris", co-created in 2020 at the Maison des réfugiés [Refugees House] by an "aide" and second year master's students in "Dynamics of Emerging and Developing Countries" at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University. The map includes both dates and spatial references related to the history of camps in Paris, popular movements and welcome protocols, as seen through the eyes of a social worker who chose to showcase the center where she enjoyed working (the Jean-Quarré Center, now closed, represented by a heart). ⬡

> **" The sun was shining over Warsaw. But it was deceiving. Though the welcome was warm and the relief of being out of the country dominated, the war was nonetheless never off of our minds. "**

Emmaus places of solidarity
● Emmanus Solidarity places
☐ Parisian Districts

0   1   2 km

HOMELAND

ODYSSEY

ESCAPE

BORDERS

BANISHMENT

RECONSTRUCTION

ROADS

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